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Abstract This paper analyzes whether the two major labor market reforms imple-
mented in Spain in the 1990s to reduce the share of temporary employment succeed
in promoting flows into permanent employment. The 1994 reform severely restricted
temporary contracts and the 1997 reform introduced a new permanent contract fig-
ure with lower payroll taxes and dismissal costs than the ordinary. To evaluate these
non-targeted treatments I present an estimation procedure that uses pre-treatment out-
comes to predict the one thatwould have been otherwise observed in the post-treatment
period in the absence of the treatment and I derive its large sample properties. Using
data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey I find that both reforms failed at reducing
the share of temporary employment because they had no impact on contract conver-
sions, which account for most new permanent contracts. The 1997 reform succeed in
increasing permanent hirings for some groups of workers. My findings suggest that
Spanish employers took advantage of wage and dismissal cost reductions to substitute
permanent contracts for otherwise temporary ones.
Keywords Permanent employment · Dismissal costs · Payroll taxes ·
Inverse probability weighted estimation · Semiparametric methods
JEL Classification J32 · J38 · J65
Introduction
Following the notable growth of unemployment rates until mid-1980s France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain increased the flexibility of
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their labor markets by allowing employers to recruit under non-causal fixed-term (also
called temporary) contracts. Although regulations vary, a common feature of fixed-
term contracts is that severance pay and dismissal protection are lower than those for
permanent contracts. Since their introduction, fixed-term contracts have accounted for
most new hirings in these countries (OECD 1993).
Spain is a interesting case to study. Soon after the reform liberalizing temporary
contracts the share of temporary employment was the highest within developed coun-
tries. The 1984 reform led to a dual labor market with a third of employees employed
on a temporary basis, receiving lower wages than otherwise equivalent permanent
employees (Bentolila and Dolado 1994), facing a higher work accident risk (Guada-
lupe 2003), and a lower probability of receiving formal training (Alba-Ramirez 1994),
marrying or entering into parenthood (De la Rica and Iza 2005).
The magnitude of the phenomenon motivated the application of countervailing
reforms aimed at promoting permanent employment. Firstly, the 1994 reform restored
the principle of causality in the application of temporary contracts. Three years later
a new major reform introduced a new permanent contract figure with lower payroll
taxes and dismissal costs than the ordinary one,whose regulation remained unchanged.
Any worker but the unemployed aged 30–45 years old could be hired under the new
permanent contract.
In this paper I evaluate the two major labor market reforms implemented in Spain
in the 1990s to lower the share of temporary employment. In particular, I analyze
whether the 1994 and the 1997 reforms succeed in increasing transitions into perma-
nent employment. The effect of the 1997 reform on net flows into permanent employ-
ment has already been analyzed in Kugler et al. (2005). By assuming that middle-aged
non-employedworkerswere not eligible for the new contract, they implement a natural
experiment research design and find that the reform improved eligible workers’ transi-
tion into permanent employment probabilities, particularly so for men. Nevertheless,
middle-aged workers were eligible for the new contract by simply being previously
hired under a temporary contract, since no age eligibility criteriawas stated for contract
conversions.
Additionally, Kugler et al. (2005) do not separately identify the effect of the 1997
reform from that of the 1999 National Employment Plan (NEP), passed on December
1998. The NEP announced that payroll tax reductions would last for one additional
year for permanent contracts signed until May 1999 and would be significantly lower
in magnitude and length after that date. For these two reasons, the estimates in Kugler
et al. (2005) are likely to lead to misleading conclusions about the effect of the 1997
reform.1
I present an estimation procedure that uses T − 1 pre-treatment time periods to
predict the outcome that would have been observed in the post-treatment period in
the absence of the treatment and I derive its large sample properties. The before–after,
the difference-in-differences and the difference-in-difference-in-differences estima-
tors are particular cases of the general T periods estimator. I reinterpret these estima-
tors in the context of non-targeted treatments (i.e. those applied to all employers and
1 The same holds for the estimated earnings effects of the 1997 reform in Plá and Ramos (2007), since
their identification strategy is that in Kugler et al. (2005).
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workers) like the 1994 and 1997 reforms and the NEP. The identifying conditions of
each estimator are tested using pre-treatment outcomes.
Estimates using the Spanish Labor Force Survey indicate that employers did not
change their contract conversion practices in response to either the 1994 or the 1997
reforms.The restrictions on the use of the non-causal temporary contract led to a greater
use of other types of temporary contracts rather than encouraging the use of permanent
contracts. While the 1997 reform failed in its goal of promoting contract conversions,
it succeed in improving permanent hirings for young workers, older men and middle-
aged women. These findings, in line with existing evidence on the determinants of
transitions into permanent employment in Spain, suggest that Spanish employers took
advantage of wage and dismissal cost reductions to substitute permanent contracts for
otherwise temporary ones.
Finally, estimates attest that employers reacted to the reduction in fiscal incentives
for permanent contracts announced in the NEP by transitory increasing both perma-
nent hires and contract conversions in the first half of the year 1999. This effect is
identified for young andmiddle-agedworkers and it is, for most groups of unemployed
workers, substantially larger than that of the 1997 reform. The finding that middle-
aged workers benefited from both the 1997 reform and the NEP empirically rejects
the natural experiment research design in Kugler et al. (2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the major labor
market reforms implemented in Spain from 1984 to 2000. Sections 2 and 3 describe
the identification strategy and the data used in the estimation, respectively. Section 4
presents the estimation results and, finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
1 The institutional framework
Until 1984 temporary contracts in Spain were restricted to seasonal, occasional or
temporary jobs and they accounted for less than 10 % of all existing jobs. The 1984
reform allowed employers to recruit under temporary contracts for all types of jobs
and for a maximum length of 3 years. After that period the firm had to convert the
temporary worker to a permanent status or to dismiss him.
In the early 1990s a third of Spanish employees held a temporary contract, the high-
est share of temporary employment within developed countries. The ratio increased
rapidly in response to the cost gap between temporary and permanent hiring. Man-
datory severance payments for permanent workers were 20 days’ wages per year of
tenure (up to one year’s wages) if the dismissal was considered “fair”, and 45 days’
wages per year of tenure (up to 42 months of wages) if the worker disagreed with the
dismissal and it was declared “unfair” in court.2 In sharp contrast, dismissed tempo-
rary workers received an indemnity of 12 days’ wages per year worked, which could
not be appealed in labor courts. Moreover, the compensation was zero if the employer
waited until the end of the contract length.
2 According to Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003), during 1986–1998, on average, around 72 % of cases
taken to court were declared unfair in Spain.
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Table 1 Summary of payroll tax reductions for permanent contracts in Spain
Age group May 1994 May 1997 January 1999 May 1999
Temporary workers
16–45 2.400 eurosa 50 %, 24 months 25 % additional year 25 %, 24 months
20 % third year
>45 50 % contract life 60 %, 24 months Not modified 25 % contract life
and 3.000 euros 50 % thereafter
Unemployed workers
– 40 %, 24 months 25 % additional year 35 % first year
25 % second year
>45 – 60 %, 24 months Not modified 45 % first year
50 % thereafter 40 % thereafter
From 1997 onwards payroll tax reductions applied only to the new permanent contract figure and they were
between 10 and 20 % points higher for women hired in occupations where women are underrepresented
a For workers aged less than 25 years old
The first major reform intended to reduce the incidence of temporary employment
was enacted in 1994. The 1994 reform restored the principle of causality in the appli-
cation of temporary contracts and introduced fiscal incentives for their conversion into
permanent ones for workers aged less than 25 and over 45 years old. Furthermore, the
procedural requirements for “fair” dismissals were relaxed and notice periods were
shortened in an attempt to lower dismissal costs for permanent contracts.
Two years after this reform the share of temporary employment remained almost
unchanged. The perceived inefficacy of the 1994 reform along with the fall of the
socialist Government in 1996 and its replacement by a conservative Government with
a different labor policy explain that a new major reform with the same goal were
introduced only 3 years later.
The 1997 reform, enacted inMay, was the first labor market reform agreed between
trade unions and employers’ organizations inSpain and, thus, the agreementwas totally
unexpected.3 The reform introduced a new permanent contract figure with relevant
differences with the existing one, whose regulation remained unchanged. First, man-
datory severance pay for “unfair” dismissals was 33 days’ wages per year of seniority
(up to 24 months of wages) under the new contract. Second, payroll tax reductions
ranging from 40 to 80 % and lasting for at least 2 years were introduced for the new
permanent contract. The magnitude and length of tax reductions varied with work-
ers’ age and gender and they were, for young workers, higher for contract conversions
than for permanent hirings. Table 1 summarizes payroll tax reductions for the different
groups of workers.
Third, middle-aged unemployed workers could not be hired under the new con-
tract. However, they could easily recover eligibility by simply being hired under
a temporary contract since no age restriction was stated for contract conversions,
3 Spanish newspapers informed that negotiations were likely to break down only one month before
(El País, March 3, 1997).
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as it has been highlighted in both economic and legal analysis of the reform like
Toharia (2005) and Luján (2001), respectively. However, preceding economic evalu-
ations of the 1997 reform have largely ignored this aspect of the reform and they have
assumed that unemployed middle-aged workers were excluded by reformers.
Finally, on 30th December 1998 the Spanish government passed its National Empl-
oyment Plan for 1999 (NEP) and announced that payroll tax reductions would last for
one additional year for permanent contracts signed until May 1999, but they would be
significantly lower in magnitude and length after that date.
2 The identification strategy
In this section I adapt the estimators commonly used in the evaluation of targeted
treatments (i.e. those applied to certain employers and/or workers) to the evaluation of
non-targeted treatments (i.e. those applied to all employers and workers). In particular,
I present an estimation procedure that uses T −1 pre-treatment time periods to predict
the outcome that would have been observed in the post-treatment period in the absence
of the treatment and I derive its large sample properties. The before–after (BA), the
difference-in-differences (DD) and the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
estimators are particular cases of the general T periods estimator. The effect of interest
is identified using the simplest estimator whose identifying condition is not rejected
in the pre-treatment period.
For simplicity, the identification strategy is presented for unemployed workers. Let
Y (i, t) be the outcome of interest for individual i at time t . This variable equals one
if individual i moves from unemployment at the beginning of period t to a permanent
contract in that period and zero otherwise. Additionally, X (i, t) is a vector of prede-
termined characteristics of individual i . A non-targeted policy aimed at promoting the
hiring of permanent workers, i.e. the 1997 reform, is enacted at the beginning of period
t = 1. Variable Di indicates whether individual i is observed in the last pre-treatment
period (Di = 0, t = 0) or in the post-treatment period (Di = 1, t = 1).
FollowingRubin (1974) andHeckman (1990) causality is defined in terms of poten-
tial outcomes. Variable Y0(i, t) is the outcome that individual i would attain at time
t if he had not been affected by the treatment. Equivalently, variable Y1(i, t) is the
outcome that individual i would experience at time t if he had received the treatment.
Individual causal effects cannot be computed since just one of these potential out-
comes is observed for given values of i and t and, thus, I focus on the average effect
of the treatment on the treated (ATET):
AT ET = E [Y1 (i, t) − Y0 (i, t) |t = 1] = E [Y1 (i, t) |t = 1] − E [Y0 (i, t) |t = 1].
The ATET cannot be identified using observational data since Y0(i, t) is only
observed for those unemployed in the pre-treatment period. A suitable solution is to
approximate the proportion of treated unemployed workers that would have obtained
a permanent position in the absence of the treatment by the proportion observed in the
last pre-treatment period. The validity of this approximation increases once differences
in the distribution of covariates are controlled for. Under this approximation the ATET
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is calculated as:
AT ET = E [Y (i, t) |X (i, t) , t = 1] − E [Y (i, t) | X (i, t) , t = 0]. (1)
This is a BA-type estimator and its power to identify the ATET relies on temporal
stability Holland (1986). In particular, two conditions must be met for that to be the
case: (i) unobserved individual characteristics and changing aggregate labor market
conditions do not affect permanent hires or their overall average impact remains con-
stant over time; (ii) the effect of events other than the treatment that happen between
these two periods do not contaminate the causal analysis. The identification assump-
tion for this estimator is written as:
Assumption 3.1 E [Y0 (i, t) |X (i, t) , t = 1] = E [Y0 (i, t) | X (i, t) , t = 0].
This assumption is examined by sequentially estimating Eq. (1) in the pre-treat-
ment period. Under Assumption 3.1, the vector of pre-treatment estimates is not sig-
nificantly different from zero and conditioning on observables suffices to identify the
ATET. This approach is named selection on observables (Barnow et al. 1981) in the
treatment effects literature. However, if some pre-treatment estimates differ from zero,
the BA estimator does not necessarily provide a suitable approximation to the effect
of interest.4 In that case I consider a DD-type estimator assuming that the average
conditional (on X ) outcome is not constant but experiences a constant increment over
time in the absence of the treatment.5 The identifying condition for this estimator is
Assumption 3.2. Hereinafter the individual and time arguments i and t will dropped
out to simplify the notation.
Assumption 3.2 E [Y0|X, t = 1] − E [Y0|X, t = 0] = E [Y0|X, t = 0] − E [Y0|X,
t = −1].
The ATET is now written as:
AT ET = {E [Y |X, t = 1] − E [Y | X, t = 0] }
− {E [Y | X, t = 0] − E [Y | X, t = −1]}. (2)
As before, Assumption 3.2 is tested by sequentially estimating Eq. (2) using pre-
treatment outcomes. If the vector of pre-treatment DD estimates significantly differs
from zero I consider an estimator assuming that the average conditional outcome
increases/decreases at a constant rate in the absence of the treatment.
Assumption 3.3 Let0τ denote the increment in the average conditional outcome that
would have been observed in the absence of the treatment between periods t = τ − 1
and t = τ , that is, 0τ = E[Y0|X, t = τ ] − E[Y0|X, t = τ − 1], then 01 − 00 =
00 − 0−1.
4 Similarly, Blundell et al. (2001) check whether the estimated effect of a mandatory job search assistance
program lies within typical values of the pre-treatment estimates.
5 The conventional DD estimator assumes that the increment in the average conditional outcome is inde-
pendent of treatment assignment in the absence of the treatment (Angrist and Krueger 1999).
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To compactly write this estimator let τ be the increment in the average conditional
outcome between periods t = τ − 1 and t = τ , that is, τ = E[Y | X, t = τ ] −
E[Y | X, t = τ − 1], then
AT ET = {1 − 0} − {0 − −1}. (3)
This is a DDD-type estimator (Meyer 1995). More sophisticated estimators could
be defined for the cases in which Assumption 3.3 is rejected, but that is not the case
in the current application.
Implementation is now derived for the DDD estimator and discussed for the general
estimator using T − 1 pre-treatment time periods. This estimator includes the DDD
(T = 4), the DD (T = 3) and the BA (T = 2) estimators as three particular cases.
The implementation and the asymptotic properties of the estimators are derived using
the original results developed in Abadie (2005) for the DD estimator.
Since identification is attained after conditioning on covariates, it is required that for
a given value of the covariates there is some fraction of the population in the pre-treat-
ment period to be used as controls. That is, P(D = 1) > 0 and with probability one
P(D = 1|X) < 1. Some additional notation is needed at this point. Let Dτ ∈ {0, 1}
indicate whether the worker is observed at period t = τ (Dτ = 1) and let ϒτ be
ϒτ = Dτ
P (t = τ |X) −
Dτ−1
P (t = τ − 1|X) .
Lemma 3.1 If Assumption 3.3 holds, and for values of X such that 0 < P(t = 1|X) <
1, we have E[Y1(1) − Y0(1)|X, t = 1] = E[ρY |X ] where ρ = (ϒ1 − ϒ0) − (ϒ0 −
ϒ−1).6
The expression for ρ is obtained by replacing the conditional expectations at t = τ
by expressions like (Dτ /P(t = τ |X)) in Eq. (4). The ATET is now written as
E [Y1 (1) − Y0 (1) |t = 1] = E
⎡
⎣ Y





ω = D1 − 3D0 P (t = 1|X)
P (t = 0|X) + 3D−1
P (t = 1|X)
P (t = −1|X) − D−2
P (t = 1|X)
P (t = −2|X) .
Equation (4) suggests a simple two-step method to estimate the ATET. First, condi-
tional probabilities are estimated by means of discrete choice models and fitted values
of P(t = k|X) are computed for k = {1, 0,−1,−2}. Second, fitted values are plugged
into the sample analog of Eq. (4). Under Assumption 3.3, a weighted average of the
6 The proof of Lemma 3.1 immediately follows from the corresponding proof in Abadie (2005).
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outcome variable recovers the ATET. The weighting function ω imposes the distribu-
tion of covariates for treated unemployed workers at any pre-treatment period. The




















P (t = 1|X)
P (t = j − (T − 2) |X)
]
.
The corresponding expressions for the DDD, the DD and the BA estimators are those
for T = 4, T = 3 and T = 2, respectively. The asymptotic properties of the estimators
are derived in the Appendix. Finally, the discrete nature of the dependent variable may
imply that the identification assumptions do not hold for the expectations but for some
transformation thereof. Following Blundell et al. (2001), I assume that the assump-
tions hold, if anything, for the inverse of the probability function, which I assume to
be the inverse logistic.
3 The data
The data is drawn from the rotating panel version of the Spanish Labor Force Survey
(Encuesta de Población Activa: Estadística de flujos (EPA)). This nationally represen-
tative survey is carried out on a quarterly basis on a sample of approximately 64,000
households. Each household is interviewed for a maximum of six consecutive quarters
and every quarter one sixth of the sample is renewed. The sample period ranges from
the second quarter of the year 1987 to the fourth quarter of the year 2000.
Employers, self-employed, agricultural and family workers, coop members and
those aged 65 and over are dropped from each quarter total sample. Sociodemograph-
ic information such as gender, age, level of education, region of residence, marital
status, whether the individual is the head of his household or not and the number
of employed household members but him is included in the analysis. Equivalently,
individual employment records such as tenure at current job and sector of activity are
also included. The same information is considered for unemployed workers referred
to their latest job, if any. Similarly, I also control for the length of their current unem-
ployment spell, whether they receive unemployment benefits or not and whether they
have previous work experience or not.
Information on tenure at current and previous job is based on self-reported elapsed
duration. The EPA records the answers in months whenever elapsed duration is lower
than one year and in years otherwise. Following Güell and Petrongolo (2007), I ran-
domly replace each rounded elapsed duration by one of the quarterly durations implied.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the data for temporary and unemployed workers, respec-
tively. The outcome of interest is the share of unemployed or temporary workers at a
given quarter that hold a permanent contract in the following quarter. Transition into
permanent employment probabilities are substantially lower after the 1994 reform
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics by gender and age groups (temporary workers)
Pre-1994 reform Between-reforms Post-1997 reform
<30 30–45 >45 <30 30–45 >45 <30 30–45 >45
Men
Age 20.9 33.9 49.8 21.5 33.9 49.5 21.4 34.0 49.5
Tenure (in months) 29.1 34.6 33.7 17.1 22.7 23.2 26.9 39.4 38.1
Private sector 91.4 89.3 87.8 92.4 90.0 89.3 92.7 89.4 88.4
Head of household 11.9 72.9 92.2 11.6 70.8 91.9 8.6 65.4 89.1
Married 15.2 78.1 91.6 13.5 75.7 91.5 9.1 70.1 89.2
No education 1.6 10.2 32.8 0.9 5.2 23.7 0.7 3.3 16.6
Primary education 21.8 53.3 58.4 14.7 38.2 59.5 12.2 31.0 60.4
Secondary education 53.5 23.6 5.4 54.8 38.4 11.5 57.1 45.5 16.4
Technical education 17.5 6.3 1.6 22.0 9.9 2.7 16.7 9.0 2.8
University education 5.6 6.7 1.9 7.6 8.3 2.6 13.2 11.1 3.8
Permanent contract
Probability 8.55 11.01 9.72 4.21 5.61 4.70 4.62 4.69 3.68
N 75,207 32,787 14,565 37,356 21,974 9,210 49,695 29,304 12,351
Women
Age 20.6 34.0 49.3 21.4 34.0 48.6 21.6 34.0 48.7
Tenure (in months) 30.5 38.1 50.4 17.9 28.4 31.7 25.1 42.9 48.6
Private sector 84.3 75.9 85.5 87.7 74.8 83.2 87.5 70.1 80.4
Head of household 1.8 11.2 22.4 2.9 12.6 21.4 3.5 14.9 25.5
Married 14.4 69.5 72.3 14.8 68.0 75.4 12.1 64.8 71.8
No education 1.1 9.4 35.0 0.6 4.2 23.4 0.3 2.0 13.4
Primary education 12.8 43.0 52.7 8.0 29.5 53.7 5.9 20.0 53.0
Secondary education 52.8 26.7 7.9 49.4 36.2 15.1 47.3 41.9 23.4
Technical education 19.4 6.3 1.5 24.3 12.4 3.7 18.2 11.2 4.2
University education 14.0 14.7 2.9 17.7 17.8 4.1 28.4 24.8 6.1
Permanent contract
Probability 8.10 8.30 8.32 4.36 4.78 4.91 4.30 3.37 3.03
N 50,103 17,305 6,561 25,188 13,425 4,420 35,258 19,826 5,806
The table reports means and percentages for continuous and discrete variables, respectively
than before. The same holds for the 1997 reform regarding contract conversions. Con-
versely, unemployment to permanent employment transition probabilities increase
once the 1997 reform is enacted for both young and middle-aged workers.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a more detailed description of the outcome of interest for
men and women temporary workers, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 do so for men and
womenunemployedworkers, respectively.Unlike preceding tables, these figures allow
us to distinguish between the post-1997 reform and the post-NEP periods. It follows
that transition into permanent employment probabilities follow a loosely monotoni-
cally decreasing time trend from the beginning of the sample period and they become
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics by gender and age groups (unemployed workers)
Pre-1994 reform Between-reforms Post-1997 reform
<30 30–45 >45 <30 30–45 >45 <30 30–45 >45
Men
Age 20.5 33.9 51.0 21.0 33.9 50.3 21.0 34.0 50.5
Worked before 58.7 96.8 99.9 64.7 96.4 99.9 59.8 95.0 99.7
Head of household 6.6 62.2 89.8 5.8 53.8 88.2 4.4 50.6 83.5
Married 9.1 65.9 86.7 7.6 58.2 84.8 5.0 50.8 79.9
No education 2.5 12.4 38.4 1.8 7.3 28.5 1.1 4.1 19.3
Primary education 23.4 51.6 51.1 17.0 37.4 54.5 13.2 31.8 53.8
Secondary education 51.6 23.7 6.7 53.1 38.6 11.3 53.8 43.1 19.0
Technical education 15.0 5.6 1.6 18.7 9.4 3.2 15.3 8.8 3.2
University education 7.4 6.7 2.3 9.4 7.3 2.5 16.6 12.2 4.7
Permanent contract
Probability 2.26 2.86 2.11 0.91 1.27 1.05 1.47 1.64 1.65
N 56,850 19,170 11,560 31,819 15,555 8,785 26,551 13,393 7,639
Women
Age 20.5 33.6 48.9 21.1 33.7 48.8 21.3 33.8 48.8
Worked before 45.4 71.9 73.2 54.8 83.5 83.1 52.6 83.6 85.2
Head of household 1.0 8.8 20.2 1.6 90.1 22.0 2.2 11.9 21.6
Married 16.7 71.2 73.9 17.0 69.6 74.3 13.9 69.1 75.1
No education 1.3 6.7 27.3 1.0 4.1 21.9 0.6 2.8 14.1
Primary education 13.6 39.8 56.0 9.9 26.7 52.4 7.4 20.6 50.6
Secondary education 53.0 32.6 12.0 48.7 40.4 18.5 48.0 44.7 25.3
Technical education 18.1 7.7 1.8 22.6 14.7 4.0 18.8 13.5 4.9
University education 14.1 13.3 2.8 17.7 14.2 3.2 25.2 18.5 5.2
Permanent contract
Probability 1.43 1.04 1.15 0.59 0.53 0.78 1.14 0.93 0.67
N 68,950 18,727 5,131 38,057 18,160 5,396 37,619 20,967 6,555
The table reports means and percentages for continuous and discrete variables, respectively
stable in 1994, coincidingwith both the recovery of the Spanish economy and the 1994
reform.While no significant change is observed after the 1997 reform, transitions sub-
stantially increase during the first half of the year 1999, that is, during the transitory
period of higher generosity in fiscal incentives for permanent contracts announced in
the NEP.
4 Empirical results
Table 4 summarizes the estimates presented in Tables 5 (BA), 6 (DD) and 7 (DDD)
for temporary workers and in Tables 8 (BA) and 9 (DD) for unemployed workers. For
each policy under evaluation and for each group of workers Table 4 informs on which
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Fig. 1 Temporary (quarter t) to permanent employment (t + 1) transition probabilities (men)
Fig. 2 Temporary (quarter t) to permanent employment (t + 1) transition probabilities (women)
is the estimator whose identifying conditions are held in the pre-treatment period,
on the estimated effect and on how it reflects on the increase of the transition into
permanent employment probability.
For estimation purposes, the sample period is organized as follows. As in Sect. 1,
period t = 1 is the post-treatment period for the 1997 reform. It collects flows into per-
manent employment between quarters τ and τ +1, for τ = {1997:3, 1997:4, 1998:1}.
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Fig. 3 Unemployment (quarter t) to permanent employment (t + 1) transition probabilities (men)
Fig. 4 Unemployment (quarter t) to permanent employment (t + 1) transition probabilities (women)
Remaining time periods are defined to include the same distribution of quarters.
In particular, period t = −2 is the post-treatment period for the 1994 reform and
period t = 2 includes the first half of the year 1999 and, thus, the period of higher
fiscal incentives for permanent contracts defined in the NEP. Seasonal effects are con-
trolled for by including the quarter at which the worker is observed as an element of X .
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Table 5 Before–after estimates (temporary workers)
Period Quarters Men Women
16–29 30–45 46–64 16–29 30–45 46–64
t = −8 1988:3–1989:1 −0.0317∗∗∗ −0.0078 0.0015 −0.0529∗ −0.0510∗ 0.0088
[−3.13] [−1.59] [0.73] [−2.87] [−3.05] [0.87]
t = −7 1989:3–1990:1 −0.0205∗∗∗ −0.0325 ∗∗∗ −0.0159 −0.0015 0.0007 −0.0218
[−2.78] [−2.64] [−1.42] [−0.29] [0.47] [−1.17]
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 −0.0223∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗ −0.0225∗ −0.0167∗∗∗ −0.0235∗∗∗ −0.0104
[−2.71] [−2.39] [−1.68] [−2.93] [−2.89] [−1.38]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 −0.0044 −0.0127∗ −0.0111 −0.0005 0.0018 −0.0026
[−1.39] [−1.88] [−1.43] [−0.11] [0.78] [−0.54]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 −0.0170∗∗∗ −0.0218∗∗∗ −0.0374∗∗∗ −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0196∗∗∗ −0.0033
[−2.65] [−2.79] [−3.05] [−3.04] [−2.78] [−0.48]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 −0.0066∗ −0.0142∗∗ −0.0080 −0.0044 −0.0091 −0.0046
[−1.78] [−2.08] [−1.32] [−1.06] [−1.47] [−1.15]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 0.0011 0.0006 0.0029 0.0074∗∗ −0.0011 0.0049
[0.52] [0.28] [0.33] [1.99] [−0.63] [0.74]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 0.0041 −0.0017 0.0019 −0.0058 0.0048 −0.0023
[0.81] [−0.36] [0.84] [−0.93] [0.47] [−0.19]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 −0.0070∗∗ −0.0079∗∗ −0.0061 −0.0032 −0.0107∗∗ −0.0034
[−2.13] [−2.09] [−0.73] [−0.31] [−2.07] [−0.24]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 −0.0010 −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0074 −0.0027 −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0059
[−0.30] [−2.74] [−0.51] [−0.63] [−2.84] [−0.61]
t = 2 1998:3–1999:1 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0100
[3.47] [3.19] [0.90] [2.96] [3.41] [0.94]
t = 3 1999:3–2000:1 −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗ −0.0122∗ −0.0120∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0139∗
[−2.78] [−3.08] [−1.72] [−3.12] [−2.96] [−1.78]
The before–after estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent employment in periods t and
t − 1 as indicated in Eq. (1). The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using
the delta method. The estimates control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital
status, whether he is the head of his household or not, the number of employed household members but
him, the quarter at which he is observed, tenure at current job and the establishment’s sector of activity
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
According to Table 4, transition into permanent employment probabilities are more
stable for unemployed than for temporary workers since the estimators that identify
the effects of interest are always at most as sophisticated for unemployed than for tem-
porary workers. In particular, while the conditional probability of getting a permanent
position lowers from the beginning of the sample period until 1994 for both young
unemployed and temporary workers, it does so at a constant rate in the former case
and at a decreasing rate in the latter one. Thus, the estimators that identify the effect
of the 1994 reform for young unemployed and temporary workers are the DD and the
DDD estimators, respectively.
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Table 6 Difference-in-differences estimates (temporary workers)
Period Quarters Men Women
16–29 30–45 46–64 16–29 30–45
t = −7 1989:3–1990:1 0.0114 −0.0233 −0.0163 0.0506∗∗∗ 0.0415
[1.47] [−1.39] [−1.10] [2.86] [1.50]
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 −0.0016 0.0142 −0.0071 −0.0150 −0.0270
[−0.41] [1.28] [−0.78] [−1.31] [−1.43]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 0.0166∗∗ 0.0030 0.0055 0.0174∗∗ 0.0258
[1.98] [0.37] [0.82] [2.43] [1.18]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 −0.0105∗ −0.0115 −0.0226 −0.0121 −0.0169
[−1.90] [−1.27] [−1.07] [−1.32] [−1.07]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 0.0124∗∗ 0.0132 0.0032 0.0308∗ 0.0161
[2.07] [0.84] [1.34] [2.77] [1.02]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 0.0073 0.0113 0.0118 0.0157∗ 0.0092
[0.51] [0.67] [0.76] [1.79] [0.93]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 0.0028 −0.0020 0.0018 −0.0131∗ 0.0075
[0.79] [−0.59] [0.58] [−1.82] [0.60]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 −0.0089 −0.0059 −0.0072 0.0023 −0.0165
[−1.09] [−0.51] [−1.14] [0.45] [−0.76]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 0.0061 −0.0025 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0056
[0.33] [−0.73] [−0.87] [0.52] [−0.36]
t = 2 1996:3–1997:1 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0136 0.0134∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗
[2.85] [2.74] [1.51] [2.26] [3.28]
t = 3 1997:3–1998:1 −0.0166∗∗ −0.0225∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0347∗∗∗
[−2.31] [−2.18] [0.94] [−2.63] [−3.13]
The difference-in-differences estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent employment in
periods t , t − 1 and t − 2 as indicated in Eq. (1)
The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The estimates
control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital status, whether he is the head of his
household or not, the number of employed household members but him, the quarter at which he is observed,
tenure at current job and the establishment’s sector of activity
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
Additionally, BA estimates in Tables 5 and 8 attest that while the probability of a
permanent hire becomes stable from 1994 onwards for young and middle-aged work-
ers, that of a contract conversion lowers again from 1996 onwards for young men and
for middle-aged temporary workers. Differences in the dynamics of the outcome vari-
able between unemployed and temporary workers almost vanish when looking at older
workers. Their probability of a permanent position remains unchanged with respect
to that in the preceding period during the whole sample period for any collective of
older workers but for men before the 1994 reform. Thus, the BA estimator suffices to
identify the effects of interest for older workers but that of the 1994 reform for older
men temporary workers, identified using the DD estimator.
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Table 7 Difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates (young temporary workers)
Period Quarters Men Women
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 −0.0102 −0.0662∗∗
[−1.48] [−1.98]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 0.0172 0.0344∗∗
[0.83] [2.11]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 −0.0213 −0.0191
[−1.32] [−1.17]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 0.0194 −0.0220
[1.26] [−0.74]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 −0.0037 −0.0915
[−0.55] [−0.63]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 −0.0047 −0.0352∗∗
[−0.53] [−2.38]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 −0.0139 0.0147
[−1.22] [1.36]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 0.0171∗∗ −0.0021
[2.07] [−1.18]
t = 2 1995:3–1996:1 0.0064 0.0117
[1.53] [1.61]
t = 3 1999:3–2000:1 −0.0274 −0.0430∗∗
[1.47] [2.30]
The difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent
employment in periods t , t − 1, t − 2 and t − 3 as indicated in Eq. (3)
The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The estimates
control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital status, whether he is the head of his
household or not, the number of employed household members but him, the quarter at which he is observed,
tenure at current job and the establishment’s sector of activity
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
Estimates in Table 4 indicate that the 1994 reform did not affect transition into per-
manent employment probabilities for either temporary or unemployed workers. This
suggests that temporary hiring was a deep-rooted practice among Spanish employers
at the time of the 1994 reform and neither fiscal incentives nor the restrictions to the
use of one type of temporary contract (the non-causal one) led to a greater use of other
types but not to encourage the use of permanent contracts. The evidence in Malo and
Toharia (1999) supports this interpretation. They find that causal temporary contracts
increased their relevance in total hirings by 20 % points from 1994 to 1997, an incre-
ment of similar magnitude to the relevance of non-causal temporary contracts in total
hirings in the year 1991.
Estimates for period t = 1 in Table 4 show that the 1997 reform failed in its goal
of promoting contract conversions. Conversely, it succeed in improving permanent
hirings for young workers, older men and middle-aged women. The share of tempo-
rary employment remained almost unchanged after the reform since permanent hirings
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Table 8 Before–after estimates (unemployed workers)
Period Quarters Men Women
16–29 30–45 46–64 16–29 30–45 46–64
t = −8 1988:3–1989:1 −0.0024 −0.0090 −0.0191 −0.0009 0.0026 −0.0177
[−0.75] [−0.99] [−1.11] [−0.54] [0.19] [−0.28]
t = −7 1989:3–1990:1 −0.0100∗∗∗ −0.0022 −0.0078 −0.0044∗ 0.0006 −0.0189
[−2.79] [−0.32] [−1.41] [−1.88] [0.43] [−0.71]
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 −0.0004 −0.0108∗ 0.0075 −0.0033∗ −0.0024 −0.0064
[−1.02] [−1.78] [0.53] [−1.75] [−0.43] [−0.57]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0129 −0.0008 −0.0027 −0.0007
[−2.81] [−0.76] [−1.39] [−0.17] [−0.85] [−0.49]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 −0.0082∗∗∗ −0.0061∗ −0.0039 −0.0041 ∗∗∗ −0.0051∗ −0.0011
[−2.57] [−1.91] [−1.17] [−2.97] [−1.78] [−0.41]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 −0.0004 −0.0022 −0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0049
[0.87] [−0.50] [−0.51] [0.32] [0.41] [0.95]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 −0.0005 0.0028 0.0061 −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0016 −0.0008
[−0.74] [0.27] [0.89] [−2.39] [−0.54] [−0.61]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 0.0003 −0.0032 −0.0106 0.0012 0.0022 −0.0016
[−0.35] [−0.57] [0.28] [0.43] [0.65] [−0.31]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 0.0013 0.0022 −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0009 0.0036
[−1.05] [0.11] [−0.19] [0.74] [−0.84] [0.51]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 0.0022∗ 0.0004 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0017∗ 0.0033∗∗ 0.0005
[1.68] [0.15] [2.71] [1.71] [2.28] [0.49]
t = 2 1998:3–1999:1 0.0051∗∗ 0.0070∗∗ 0.0010 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0030∗ −0.0033
[2.13] [2.15] [0.93] [3.11] [1.81] [−0.50]
t = 3 1999:3–2000:1 −0.0001 −0.0027 0.0023 −0.0015 0.0001 0.0043∗∗
[−0.22] [0.51] [0.27] [0.42] [0.19] [−1.99]
The before–after estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent employment in periods t and
t − 1 as indicated in Eq. (1)
The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The estimates
control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital status, whether he is the head of his
household or not, the number of employed household members but him, the quarter at which he is observed,
tenure and sector of activity referred to his latest job, if any, the length of their current unemployment spell,
whether they receive unemployment benefits or not and whether they have previous work experience or not
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
accounted for less than 15 % of new permanent contracts at that time according to
own calculations using the EPA. The estimated effects for young men and women
amount to an improvement of 22.9 and 26.2 % in their probability of moving from
unemployment to a permanent position, respectively. The increase was substantially
higher for older men and middle-aged women. Their probability of obtaining a per-
manent position increased by approximately 60 % with respect to what would have
been otherwise observed in the absence of the 1997 reform.
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Table 9 Difference-in-differences estimates (unemployed workers)
Period Quarters Men Women
16–29 30–45 16–29 30–45
t = −7 1989:3–1990:1 −0.0077 0.0085 −0.0042 −0.0053
[−0.89] [0.91] [−0.18] [−0.73]
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 0.0113∗∗ −0.0081 0.0020 −0.0043
[2.08] [−1.37] [−0.75] [−1.52]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 −0.0050 0.0050 0.0022 0.0003
[−0.42] [0.81] [0.93] [0.47]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 −0.0031 −0.0024 −0.0023 −0.0057
[−0.31] [−1.01] [−0.59] [−0.53]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 0.0076∗ 0.0044 0.0039 0.0079
[1.76] [0.71] [1.31] [0.73]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 0.0005 0.0047 −0.0033 −0.0027
[0.17] [0.59] [−1.47] [−0.95]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 0.0010 −0.0065 0.0038 0.0039
[0.47] [−0.44] [0.61] [1.18]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 0.0012 0.0051 −0.0012 −0.0031
[0.52] [0.83] [−0.92] [−0.31]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 0.0010 −0.0012 0.0017 0.0045∗
[0.63] [−1.08] [1.48] [1.87]
t = 2 1998:3–1999:1 0.0033 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.0002
[1.45] [2.77] [1.31] [0.57]
t = 3 1999:3–2000:1 −0.0049∗∗ −0.0095∗∗ −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0026
[−2.28] [−2.31] [−2.03] [−1.47]
The before–after estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent employment in periods t and
t − 1 as indicated in Eq. (1)
The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The estimates
control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital status, whether he is the head of his
household or not, the number of employed household members but him, the quarter at which he is observed,
tenure and sector of activity referred to his latest job, if any, the length of their current unemployment spell,
whether they receive unemployment benefits or not and whether they have previous work experience or not
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
The estimates in Table 4 also attest that employers reacted to the NEP by increasing
both permanent hires and contract conversions during the first half of 1999. This effect
is identified for young and middle-aged workers and it is, for most groups of unem-
ployedworkers, substantially larger than that of the 1997 reform. The estimated effects
amount to an improvement of at least 35 % in the probability of getting a permanent
position. The increment becomes highest for middle-aged women temporary workers,
whose probability of obtaining a permanent contract improved by 71 % after the NEP.
Anyway, these were transitory effects, as suggested by the negative and significant
estimates obtained for young and middle-aged temporary and unemployed workers in
period t = 3 using the same estimator that identifies the effect of the NEP in Table 4.
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These findings are in line with evidence on the determinants of transitions into
permanent employment in Spain. In particular, Amuedo-Dorantes (2001) examines
the determinants of Spanish employers’ reliance on temporary workers between the
years 1990–1996 using a representative sample of establishments with more than five
employees.7 She finds that changes in wage and dismissal costs for permanent con-
tracts affect the hiring of permanent workers but have almost no impact on contract
conversions, which primarily respond to employers’ flexibility needs and unions’ pres-
sures for increased employment stability. She concludes that Spanish employers might
be unwilling to forgo employment flexibility through contract conversion regardless
of the employment cost.
Recent findings on the duration and total labor cost of the permanent contract intro-
duced in 1997 are useful to interpret the estimates in Table 4. Cebrian et al. (2005)
find, using administrative records on permanent contracts signed in Spain between the
years 1996 and 1999, that permanent hires under the new contract increase the hazard
rate of ending the contract by 17–32% relative to that of ordinary permanent contracts
and lead to less stable trajectories, i.e. to a higher probability of the worker being
unemployed or out of the labor market in the subsequent years. In a related study,
Cueto (2006) finds that hires under the new contract are more stable than those under
the ordinary permanent contract while the former enjoys wage benefits, becoming less
stable afterwards. Malo and Toharia (1999) calculate the total labor costs, including
dismissal costs, of the new permanent contract and find that it is marginally cheaper
than a temporary contract while wage benefits are operative.
These findings, jointlywith the estimates in Table 4, suggest that Spanish employers
took advantage of wage and dismissal costs reduction measures to substitute perma-
nent contracts for otherwise temporary ones. This further explains why the share
of temporary employment did not decrease after the 1997 reform. In a related set-
ting, García-Pérez and Rebollo (2009) evaluate the effectiveness of regional wage
subsidies in Spain to foster permanent employment and find that the outflow into
permanent employment improves only minimally.
It is worth noting that middle-aged unemployed women increased their transition
into permanent employment probabilities after both the 1997 reform and the NEP
according to the estimates in Table 4. For middle-aged unemployed men, it was the
NEP the policy that improved their permanent employment prospects. These findings
empirically rejects the natural experiment research design for non-employed workers
in Kugler et al. (2005). They recognize that no age eligibility criteria was stated for
temporary workers but they abstract from the possibility that non-employed middle-
aged workers at quarter τ can held a new permanent contract at the following quarter if
they are previously hired under a temporary contract that is shortly promoted into the
new permanent one. Indeed, that would also be the case for young workers since wage
reductions for these workers were higher for contract conversions than for permanent
hirings after the 1997 reform according to Table 1.
Own calculations using the EPA confirm that the average tenure of the temporary
contracts converted into permanent ones lowered after the 1997 reform for youngwork-
7 Own calculations using the EPA indicate that establishments with more than five employees account
from 1990 to 1996, on average, for 84 and 71 % of men and women employees in Spain, respectively.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:175–199 195
ers and, particularly so, for middle-aged women, while it remained almost unchanged
for the other groups of workers. For young workers, the average tenure of the contracts
converted in the year after the 1997 reform was 2 and 3 months lower than it was one
year before the reform for men and women, respectively. For middle-aged women, the
reduction in the average tenure of converted contracts amounts to 7 months. For these
workers, temporary contracts lasting for at most 3 months increased their relevance in
the total number of converted contracts by more than 11 % points in that period. The
increment was of approximately 5 % points for young workers and it was negligible
for the remaining groups of workers.
Another reason why the results in Kugler et al. (2005) might be misleading is
because they do not separately identify the effect of the 1997 reform from that of the
NEP. As Table 4 indicates, this is particularly relevant for temporary workers since
they were not affected by the 1997 reform. While Kugler et al. (2005) present joint
estimates for temporary workers of all age groups and find that contract conversions
increased after the 1997 reform, estimates in Table 4 qualify that it was only after the
NEP when contract conversions increased for these workers.
Regarding non-employed workers, Kugler et al. (2005) find that young and older
men improved their transition into permanent employment probabilities after the 1997
reform relative to the “excluded”groupofmiddle-agedworkers. To investigatewhether
the definition of the post-reform period is driving their results, Table 10 presents
between-group estimates where I compare, for each period t , young and older men
unemployed workers’ transition probabilities to that of the middle-aged.8 I find no
significant estimate from 1993 to 1998 for either young or older men. That is, by
adopting a natural experiment research design I reach to the conclusion that it was the
NEP not the 1997 reform the policy that improved young and older men’s flows into
permanent employment.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzeswhether the twomajor labormarket reforms implemented in Spain
in the nineties to lower the share of temporary employment succeed in promoting flows
into permanent employment. The 1994 reform restored the principle of causality in the
application of temporary contracts and the 1997 reform introduced a new permanent
contract with lower payroll taxes and dismissal costs than the ordinary one, whose
regulation remained unchanged.
Although this is not the first evaluation of the 1997 reform, the estimates in pre-
ceding studies are likely to lead to misleading conclusion for two reasons. First, they
assume that non-employed middle-aged workers could not be hired under the new
contract. However, no age eligibility criteria was stated for contract conversions and,
thus, employers could hire non-employed middle-aged workers under a temporary
contract and promote it to the new permanent contract. Second, they do not separately
identify the effect of the 1997 reform from that of the 1999 National Employment
8 For men, the difference between unemployed and non-employed workers is not likely to be an issue
leading to different estimation results.
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Table 10 Between-groups estimates (men unemployed workers)
Period Quarters 16–29 46–64
t = −9 1987:3–1988:1 0.0114 0.0036
[0.82] [1.47]
t = −8 1988:3–1989:1 0.0043 0.0199
[0.31] [1.27]
t = −7 1989:3–1990:1 −0.0096 0.0238
[−0.39] [1.63]
t = −6 1990:3–1991:1 −0.0061 0.0107∗
[−0.85] [1.95]
t = −5 1991:3–1992:1 0.0121∗ 0.0093
[1.72] [0.39]
t = −4 1992:3–1993:1 0.0227∗ 0.0025
[1.89] [0.97]
t = −3 1993:3–1994:1 0.0043 0.0062
[0.63] [0.36]
t = −2 1994:3–1995:1 −0.0020 −0.0033
[−0.42] [−0.42]
t = −1 1995:3–1996:1 0.0009 −0.0023
[0.48] [−0.98]
t = 0 1996:3–1997:1 −0.0027 0.0089
[−0.94] [1.53]
t = 1 1997:3–1998:1 0.0003 −0.0001
[0.31] [−0.72]
t = 2 1998:3–1999:1 0.0125∗ 0.0090∗∗
[1.94] [2.38]
t = 3 1999:3–2000:1 0.0129∗ −0.0090∗
[1.77] [−2.25]
The difference-in-differences estimate for period t compares transitions into permanent employment in
periods t , t − 1 and t − 2 as indicated in Eq. (2)
The table reports t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The estimates
control for the worker’s level of education, region of residence, marital status, whether he is the head of his
household or not, the number of employed household members but him, the quarter at which he is observed,
tenure and sector of activity referred to his latest job, if any, the length of their current unemployment spell,
whether they receive unemployment benefits or not and whether they have previous work experience or not
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively
Plan (NEP). The NEP was passed on December 1998 announcing that fiscal incen-
tives for permanent contracts would be significantly lower for contracts signed after
May 1999.
I present an estimation procedure that uses T − 1 pre-treatment time periods to
predict the outcome that would have been otherwise observed in the post-treatment
period in the absence of the treatment and I derive its large sample properties. The
before–after, the difference-in-differences and the difference-in-difference-in-differ-
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ences estimators are particular cases of the general T periods estimator for T = 2,
3 and 4, respectively. I reinterpret these estimators in the context of non-targeted
treatments (i.e. those applied to all employers and workers) like the 1994 and 1997
reforms and the NEP. The identifying conditions of each estimator are tested using
pre-treatment outcomes.
Estimates using the Spanish Labor Force Survey suggest that employers did not
change their contract conversion practices in response to either the 1994 or the 1997
reforms. The restrictions on the use of the non-causal temporary contract led to a
greater use of other types of temporary contracts rather than encouraging the use of
permanent contracts. While the 1997 reform failed in its goal of promoting contract
conversions, it succeed in improving permanent hirings for young workers, older men
and middle-aged women. Given the lower stability of permanent hires under the new
contract relative to that of ordinary permanent contracts, this finding suggests that
Spanish employers took advantage of wage and dismissal cost reductions to substitute
permanent contracts for otherwise temporary ones.
Finally, I find that employers reacted to the NEP by transitory increasing both
permanent hires and contract conversions during the first half of 1999. This effect is
identified for young andmiddle-agedworkers and it is, for most groups of unemployed
workers, substantially larger than that of the 1997 reform.
The finding that middle-aged workers improved their transition into permanent
employment probabilities after both the 1997 reform and the NEP rejects the natural
experiment research design in preceding evaluations of the 1997 reform. I provide evi-
dence suggesting that employers used temporary hiring as way of securing the access
of middle-aged non-employed workers to the new permanent contract. In particular,
the average tenure of temporary contracts converted into permanent ones lowered
after the 1997 reform for middle-aged workers and, to a lesser extent, for workers for
which payroll tax reductions were higher for contract conversions than for permanent
hirings, as it was the case for young workers.
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Appendix: Asymptotic properties
This section adapts the asymptotic results developed in Abadie (2005) for the DD
estimator to the general T -periods estimator. The expressions for the DDD, DD and
BA estimates are those for T = 3, T = 2 and T = 1, respectively. Consider the
following estimate of the ATET
β0 = arg min
β ∈ E
[
π1 {ρY − β}2
]
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andπk(X) = πk(X ′iγ0) = P(t = k/X), for k = {1, 0,−1,−2, . . .}. Provided that the
standard regularity conditions inAbadie (2005,Assumption 4.2(i)–(iv)) hold,γ0 can be
estimated by means of standard discrete choice models like the probit or logit models
and γ̂ is asymptotically linear, that is, n1/2(γ̂ − γ0) = n−1/2 ∑ni=1 ψγ0(Zi )+ Op(1),
where








































πk = ∂πk(v)/∂v and ·πk0 = ·πk(X ′γ0), for k = {1, 0,−1,−2, . . .}. Under the
conditions stated in the following theorem, and provided that β0 is an interior point of
a compact set  ⊂ R and EY 2 < ∞, β̂ is well-defined with probability approaching
one.
Theorem A1 If nk → ∞ for each k, and provided that the identification assump-
tion of the general T −periods estimator holds, √n(β̂ − β0) d→ N (0, V ), where
V = Q−1Q−1, Q = E[D1],  = E[ψψ ′], ψ = m(Z , β0, γ0) + Mγ0ψγ0 , and
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where π̂k(Xi ) = πk(X ′i γ̂ ) and ψ̂i = π̂1(Xi )(ρ̂i Yi − β̂) + M̂γ̂ ψ̂γ̂ (Zi ). A formal proof
of Theorem A1 can be easily derived from the proof of Theorem 4.3 in Abadie (2005)
by simply replacing ρ and the first step likelihood function by its expressions for the
general T -period estimator. Similarly, it can be shown that under the assumptions
of Theorem A1 and assuming that πk(v) is twice differentiable with bounded second
derivative in υ, V̂
p→ V (see Abadie 2005, Theorem 4.4).
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